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ABSTRACT: The language of Supreme Court opinions plays an important role in
legal discourse and defining the law in this country. This Comments builds upon
earlier work in this Journal which empirically examined the lack of the words
"feminist" and "feminism" in Supreme Court opinions. This Comment suggests
an inclusive language of feminism that speaks to a woman's autonomy,
recognizes paternalistic structures in the law, and includes an intersectional look
at how poverty, class, race, and gender all affect a woman's lived experience
and access to rights. Using Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, this Comment
imagines how an opinion with an outcome feminist might desire would be
stronger for women if it had been written with the language of feminism and
what positive outcomes such language could produce.
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INTRODUCTION
"Language is 'a medium ofsocial action' not 'merely a vehicle of
communication' and the written judicial opinion is the primary, ifnot the sole,
medium in which judges within our judicial system execute language."
"The decision of whether or not to bear a child is central
to a woman's hfe, her well-being, and her dignity. "2
The Supreme Court of the United States is not known as a bastion of
feminism. With only four female justices in its history, it can hardly even be
considered an equitably staffed institution. However, for centuries, women
have had to look to the Supreme Court to protect and define their rights - right
to work, right to equal treatment, right to reproductive freedom. While the
Court has been articulating women's rights, it has failed at using the language
of feminism, the language of women, to define and support them. And though
those opinions may have succeeded in upholding women's rights and
1. Rachael K. Hinkle et al., A Positive Theory and Empirical Analysis of Strategic Word Choice in
District Court Opinions, 4 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 407, 408 (2012) (internal citations omitted).
2. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary on the Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to Be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 103rd Cong. 207 (1993) (statement of
Ruth Bader Ginsburg).
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supporting the feminist cause, it is a loss to women and to society as a whole
that those decisions are not articulated as feminist decisions. The language of
opinions matters because opinions matter.
This comment builds on the empirical and theoretical works of other
scholars to reimagine an alternative history where one of the most important
reproductive rights cases of the last decade, Whole Woman's Health v.
Hellerstedt,3 was written not only with a strong articulation of the undue
burden standard, but also with a language of feminism. This comment begins to
construct a language of feminism. It is language that reaffirms the bodily
integrity and autonomy of women over restrictive abortion regulations that
states enact; a language that acknowledges the hierarchical and paternal
structures that seek to control women's choices under the banner of protection;
and a language that recognizes the intersectionality of race, poverty, and gender
that creates a unique reality for every woman, which affects and limits the
exercise of her constitutional rights.
I. THE LANGUAGE USED IN SUPREME COURT OPIMONS MATTERS
The language in Supreme Court opinions is important because of the
quintessential role those opinions play in our country. This section discusses
the variety of purposes in that Supreme Court opinions serve. It also
demonstrates how words in opinions are carefully chosen and weighed for their
individual value. Further, it explores feminist scholars' argument that structural
biases in the system can go unnoticed when certain language is omitted from
the language of law.
A. The Power and Purpose ofSupreme Court Opinions
Supreme Court opinions, first and foremost, serve a vital role of speaking
to other courts. Opinions provide lower courts with specific instructions on
how they should apply the law and articulate the Court's reasoning for
decisions. The Supreme Court recognizes the importance of providing guidance
to lower courts.4 Not only can opinions provide specific legal answers and
instructions, but they can also signal to lower courts where the law may be
going in the future, and the strength of certain judge's opinions. "Thus, the text
of judicial decisions and opinions constitutes the law by which our common
law system abides and the basis on which judges, lawyers, and citizens make
reasoned legal judgments about future action."5 Second, Supreme Court
3. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
4. See Hinkle et al., supra note 1, at 409.
5. Id.
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opinions serve as a source of legitimacy for the Court among the public. For an
institution that is notoriously secretive and unapproachable in the eyes of the
public, opinions often serve as the general population's only insight into the
thought process and decision-making strategies of the justices.6 When the
public can read the justices' words, it lends a sense of legitimacy to the
decisions the Court is making. "In the common law tradition, the court's ability
to develop case law finds legitimacy only because the decision is accompanied
by a publicly recorded statement of reasons."7 Finally, Supreme Court opinions
serve a signaling function to lawyers, Congress, and the public at large. They
"are a form of discourse between and among various groups," and serve as the
voice of the Supreme Court.8
B. Strategic Word Choice in Opinions
In Supreme Court opinions today, "[w]hat a judge writes is as important as
what a judge decides." 9 The language and rhetoric of an opinion is often the
most salient part of a decision. "Ultimately it is the language of the Court that
is used as a precedent for future decisions."10 Because the language used in an
opinion is so vital, choosing the correct words is an important part of
conveying the judge's message. "The breadth and malleability of the English
language allow a judge a wide range of options in selecting the 'right word,'
and this selection may have 'special legal significance,' allowing a judge to
'make subtle distinctions between ideas by changing a single word."'"
Each individual word matters when drafting an opinion, as it can often
have an impact well beyond the case at hand. The choice of language that is
used in opinions can have effects on future cases. Language choice "can be the
difference in whether entirely new avenues of litigation are spawned or not." 12
Further, use of language can focus advocates on new courses of legislation. 13
6. See Meredith Dost, Dim Public Awareness of Supreme Court as Major Rulings Loom, PEW RES.
CTR. (May 14, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/14/dim-public-awareness-of-
supreme-court-as-major-rulings-loom [https://permacc/P9N6-DYMC].
7. Hinkle et al., supra note 1, at 408 (citation omitted) (quoting Judge Ruggero John Aldisert).
8. Id. at 410.
9. Id. (citation omitted).
10. Frank B. Cross & James W. Pennebaker, The Language of the Roberts Court, 2014 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 853, 856.
11. Hinkle et al., supra note 1, at 410-11 (internal citations omitted).
12. Adam Feldman, A Brief Assessment of Supreme Court Opinion Language, 1946-2013, 86 Miss.
L.J. 105, 107 (2017).
13. For example, Justice Kennedy's language in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), in which
he suggested that there was sufficient justification for states to pass informed consent laws based
on the fact that women may regret their abortions, spawned a new focus by anti-abortion groups
passing on informed consent laws, see infra note 71.
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The justices recognize the importance of careful word choice as well. Chief
Justice Roberts once said, "Language is the central tool of our trade. When
we're construing the Constitution, we're looking at words. Those are the
building blocks of the law. And so if we're not fastidious, as you put it, with
language, it dilutes the effectiveness and clarity of the law."1 4 Justice Scalia
talked about being a "nitpicker" for words and "using a word precisely the way
it should be used."15 The authors of Supreme Court Opinions also recognize
that down to the last word, the language of their opinions matter.
C. Lack ofLanguage Can Obscure Structural Bias
Some scholars argue that language missing from the legal discourse can
obscure structural bias within that legal system. Although "[s]ystematic
inequalities are not intrinsic to law," they "may be rooted in the subjective (and
often unconscious) beliefs and assumptions of the decision makers." 16 These
inequalities can be rooted in the theory of law, "often bound in traditional
assumptions and power hierarchies," but also in the language used. 17 Feminist
legal scholars, especially Professor Kathryn Stanchi, argue that legal language
"both reflects and consolidates existing social structures, including inequitable
relations and power differentials." 8 Professor Stanchi argues, as detailed
below, that legal language is "traditionally accessible only to the wealthy and
powerful and notorious for its conservatism and imperviousness to ideas that
challenge its basic assumptions." 9
Professor Stanchi uses the muting theory to describe how the language of
law has historically kept out marginalized voices. Muting theory asserts that
those without power in society do not have equal access to the language of that
society.20 This theory is based on the idea that different groups have different
experiences and perspectives that will generate different realities. 2 1 However,
due to power differentials between groups, "all groups will not have equal
access to the language through which experiences, realities, and perspectives
are expressed." 22 Professor Stanchi asserts that law represents a unique
14. Feldman, supra note 12, at 107.
15. Cross & Pennebaker, supra note 10, at 860.
16. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 5
(Kathryn M. Stanchi et al. eds. 2016).
17. Id. at 4.
18. Kathryn M. Stanchi, Feminist Legal Writing, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 387, 388 (2002).
19. Id.
20. Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance is Futile: How Legal Writing Pedagogy Contributes to the Law's
Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 103 DICK. L. REV. 7, 16-17 (1998).
21. Id. at 17.
22. Id.
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language "that some linguists call a 'language of power' or 'high language' - a
prestigious type of language that must be used if the speaker is to function
effectively and to which only the most powerful members of society have
access." 23 Language is, therefore, defined by those in power.
Professor Stanchi connects muting theory to the law when she notes that,
"[T]he 'fit' between the subdominant reality or experience and the acceptable
mode of expression ... [i]ndividual members of subdominant groups are muted
in the sense that they are forced to express their reality in an imperfect way by
using the language of the dominant group." 24 The limitations in the vocabulary
available for use in legal writing can mute outside voices and diminish the
reality of individual's experiences. 2 5 Professor Stanchi offers sexual
harassment as a feminist example of muting theory. Catharine MacKinnon is
largely credited with bringing the term "sexual harassment" into existence;
however, before she did, it was difficult for women to express the reality of the
unwanted attention they were receiving at work.2 6 Until there was a name for
this type of behavior, it was difficult for women to communicate their
expenence.
Professor Stanchi goes further to argue that several elements of legal
writing specifically reinforce traditional power structures. First, the law's
emphasis on writing to a particular audience, those in positions of power who
are often older, affluent, white men, contributes to muting the voices of
outsiders.2 7 In order to be successful at legal writing, one must tailor his or her
writing to fit the current language of law designed by the dominant group and
must assimilate into that language. Further, because of the focus on stare
decisis and legal rules, "the assigned framework will almost always be one that
reflects existing law" and "[a]s a result, it will also reflect the law's biases and
hierarchies." 2 8 Traditional power structures and biases are engrained in the
language of law and legal writing.
II. FEMINIST LANGUAGE IN SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
Use of the word "feminism" in Supreme Court opinions is rare. Yet as
described above, Supreme Court opinions play an important role in our legal
discourse, and "word choice is important because it influences reality."2 9
23. Id. at 9.
24. Id. at 17.
25. Id. at 40-43.
26. Stanchi, Resistance is Futile, supra note 20, at 17 n.61.
27. Id at 20-21.
28. Id. at 28.
29. McKaye L. Neumeister, By Any Other Name: The Vocabulary of "Feminism" at the Supreme
Court, 29 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 241, 243 (2017).
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Though there is little study of the prevalence of general feminist language and
feminist theory in Supreme Court opinions, one empirical study undertakes to
examine the use of the word "feminist" and "feminism" in opinions.30 Though
the words "feminist" and "feminism" are not the end point for considering
feminist language in opinions, they are a good starting point. They also
provides a basis on which to build a definition of the language of feminism for
this comment.
A. Lack of "Vocabulary ofFeminism" in Supreme Court Opinions
In 2017, McKaye Neumeister published a note in this Journal that included
an empirical study of what she called the "vocabulary of feminism" in Supreme
Court opinions. 3 1 Neumeister focused specifically on the words "feminist" and
"feminism," to look not only at the absence of those words, but also to consider
why the Court avoids them.32 Neumeister argued that "[i]nsofar as the Court
plays a role in normalizing gender equality, and acceptance of feminism as part
of that project, the Court's non-use of the words matters." 3 3
Neumeister's review of Supreme Court opinions found that only twenty-
two decisions by the Supreme Court had used the words "feminist" or
"feminism." 34 Neumeister found that, under her definition, the vocabulary of
feminism has only been used substantively twice in Supreme Court opinions.s
The first was in a dissent by Justice Scalia, arguing that "antifeminism" was not
the basis for the male-only Virginia Military Institute's exclusion of women. 6
Chief Justice Rehnquist responded in his concurrence, "[w]e may find that
diversity was not the Commonwealth's real reason without suggesting, or
having to show, that the real reason was 'antifeminism."' 37 The second usage,
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Neumeister notes that many other terms can be considered part the vocabulary of feminism
including "intersectionality," "gender normativity," "patriarchy," and "sex stereotyping," a theory
that this paper supports. Id. at 242 n.7.
33. Id. at 245.
34. Id. at 246. Neumeister's data are through December 2016. Id. It is important to note that feminism
is not the only named theory or movement that gets little mention in Supreme Court opinions. For
example, the word "environmentalism" only appears twice in Supreme Court opinions, both times
appearing in footnotes. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 798 n8 (2006) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 442 nl6 (1980).
35. Defining "substantively" as not in a name of organization, party, or amici, and not in decisions
denying certiorari. Neumeister, supra note 29, at 246-48.
36. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 580 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Neumeister argues that
Scalia attempts to be provocative by painting Justice Ginsburg's opinion with a feminist label that
she does not herself adopt, though Neumeister argues the VMI is undoubtedly a feminist opinion.
Neumeister, supra note 29, at 252.
37. 518 U.S. at 562 n.* (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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in a dissent by Justice Ginsberg in Coleman v. Court of Appeals, involved a
substantive discussion of the legislative history of the Family and Medical
Leave Act and the feminist activism and perspective on that law.3 8
Neumeister argued that there have been numerous opportunities to use and
to cite to feminist legal theory and literature over the years, and that the Court's
failure to do so represents a deliberate bypass. 39 The Court has decided many
cases of "feminist litigation" and used feminist arguments in opinions without
acknowledging their origins.4 0 Neumeister explained that several factors may
account for judicial aversion to using the "vocabulary of feminism" in its
opinions. She suggested that this aversion could be due to a lack of feminism in
lower court language that the Supreme Court may borrow, or to other intra-
legal factors, such as the language of legal literature or the gender of the
justices. 41 However, Neumeister ultimately argued that it is the continuing
modem hostility to feminism that keeps this vocabulary from Supreme Court
opinions.4 2
B. A Broad Conception of the Language ofFeminism
Although Neumeister's note is a good starting point for a discussion of
how the Supreme Court does and should deal with feminism, her definition of
"vocabulary of feminism" is significantly narrowed for the purpose of her
empirical study.43 This narrow definition used in Neumeister's piece limits
analysis of both the cause and effect of this lack of language. To merely add the
words "feminist" or "feminism" into legal language would most likely not
create the outcomes that this paper seeks.4 This section articulates a broader
conception of the language of feminism that looks beyond just the use of the
words "feminism" and "feminist" by including additional words, phrases, and
concepts that evoke the ideas of feminism and support feminist theory and
ideology. Part III of this article then applies this suggested language of
feminism to Justice Breyer's opinion in Whole Woman's Health.4 5
38. Coleman v. Court of Appeals, 566 U.S. 30, 48-50 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
39. Neumeister, supra note 29, at 249.
40. Id. at 249-51.
41. Id. at 254-60.
42. Id. at 262.
43. Redefining the scope of feminist language, this comment goes far beyond Neumeister's research.
It would be nearly impossible to conduct a full empirical study on such an undefined language of
feminism, and to the author's knowledge no such study exists.
44. See infra Part IV. See also the lack of additional named theories or "-isms" in opinions, supra note
34.
45. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
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Feminist language includes words that speak to a woman's autonomy. This
includes specific words such as autonomy, agency, dignity, and bodily integrity,
and language that reinforces the constitutionality of exercising choice.4 6
Feminist language includes discourse that explicitly recognizes how the
government and hierarchical systems take a paternalistic approach to regulating
and controlling women's bodies, choices, and health. Words like paternalistic
and hierarchical structure help acknowledge the realities of the current system
that continues to reflect our country's patriarchal beginnings.
However, feminist language must also include an intersectional look at
how poverty, race, and gender can inform the measurement of an individual's
access to a constitutional right. Anti-essentialism and intersectionality are
newer additions to the feminist theory cannon, but in recent years, they have
become central tenets of the feminist movement. Anti-essentialism challenges
the notion "that there is a fixed and identifiable 'essence' that characterizes a
certain set of human beings, such as women." 4 7 Intersectionality is "a legal
approach that recognizes that gender is only one potential axis of
discrimination and that discrimination against women is often combined with
and compounded by oppression based on race, sexuality, class, and
ethnicity."48 Therefore, addressing intersectionality in the language of
feminism would include specifically referencing poverty, class, and race when
discussing the ability of a woman to access her constitutional rights.
Feminist scholars also define methods of unique feminist legal writing and
analysis. One method is feminist practical reasoning, which "brings together
the voices and stories of individual women's lived experiences with the broader
46. Though there are many theories of feminism, and this paper does not seek to define feminism or
endorse one definition, it generally focuses on the battle for women's equality. Many feminist
movements, especially "third-wave" feminism, take a broader social justice position that endorses
justice for all people. See Stanchi et al., supra note 16, at 1. In defining feminist language, this
paper focuses on language specifically recognizing autonomy, etc. for women. While this paper
uses the terms of the gender binary, it does not seek to exclude trans women or other
nonconforming individuals. A focus on autonomy for "women" in the language of feminism
should not be read as abandoning a larger goal of autonomy and equality for all people, or a world
which is no longer defined by two genders.
47. Stanchi et al., supra note 16, at 21. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 585 (1990) ("gender essentialism-the notion that a unitary,
'essential' women's experience can be isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual
orientation, and other realities of experience. The result of this tendency toward gender
essentialism, I argue, is not only that some voices are silenced in order to privilege others ... but
that the voices that are silenced turn out to be the same voices silenced by the mainstream legal
voice of'We the People'-among them, the voices of black women.").
48. Stanchi et al., supra note 16, at 21. See, e.g., NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FEMINIST
LEGAL THEORY 150-51 (2d ed., 2016) ("Reproductive rights occur at the intersection of gender,
age, race, and class. For poor women, and especially poor minors, the right of choice is
meaningless without the ability to exercise it.... Race matters in myriad ways. Contraceptive use,
for example, is distinctly related to race and socioeconomic circumstances. . . . Women of color
also disproportionately suffer coerced sterilization .... ).
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historical, cultural, economic, and social context."4 9 A second method, called
the narrative feminist method, seeks a "method of subverting and disrupting
dominant legal discourse .. . to reveal and oppose the bias and power dynamics
inherent in law's purported neutrality. . . ."s
A good starting point to examine the sort of broad feminist language this
paper discusses is Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey.s" Blackmun argues that
compelled continuation of a pregnancy infringes upon a woman's right
to bodily integrity by imposing substantial physical intrusions and
significant risks of physical harm [and it] deprives a woman of the
right to make her own decision about reproduction and family
planning - critical life choices that this Court long has deemed central
to the right to privacy.5 2
In further language, Blackmun argues,
[b]y restricting the right to terminate pregnancies, the State conscripts
women's bodies into its service, forcing women to continue their
pregnancies, suffer the pains of childbirth, and in most instances,
provide years of maternal care. The State does not compensate women
for their services; instead, it assumes that they owe this duty as a
matter of course. This assumption - that women can simply be forced
to accept the "natural" status and incidents of motherhood - appears to
rest upon a conception of women's role that has triggered the
protection of the Equal Protection Clause. 53
The language Justice Blackmun uses in his Casey concurrence, though not
always in the exact words suggested above, is an example of feminist language
in a Supreme Court opinion.
III. INSERTING FEMINIST LANGUAGE INTO THE MAJORITY OPINION IN WHOLE
WOMAN'S HEALTH V. HELLERSTEDT
Abortion rights activists celebrated Whole Woman 's Health for striking
down all of Texas's controversial TRAP (Targeted Regulation of Abortion
49. Stanchi et al., supra note 16, at 15.
50. Id. at 15-16.
51. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
52. Id. at 927.
53. Id. at 928.
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Providers) laws.54 Advocates believed that the opinion would strengthen the
undue burden standard and lead to successful challenges of TRAP laws in other
states.ss However, even an opinion that is supportive of women's rights can
lack the language necessary to fully articulate and define the rights of women
that are under attack in many states. Due to the nature of alternative history, it
is impossible to measure the possible impact of feminist language in Whole
Woman 's Health; however, Part IV envisions some possible positive impacts. 56
In Whole Woman's Health, advocates for abortion rights were challenging
a Texas law that would have shut down a majority of the state's abortion
clinics.57 The Center for Reproductive Rights brought a challenge against the
admitting privileges and the surgical center requirements imposed by the Texas
law.58 In the majority opinion striking down the law, Justice Breyer took a fact-
based approach to analyzing the undue burden standard articulated in Casey.59
After dealing with the claim preclusion issues in the case, Justice Breyer
defined the legal standard and then applied it to both the admitting privileges
and surgical center requirement. The Court found that both requirements were
unconstitutional undue burdens on the right to abortion.
Whole Woman 's Health is a good outcome for women, but its language
could do more. Justice Breyer's articulation of the undue burden standard could
prove to be a useful legal tool for advocates in future cases, but removing this
test or taking away from the fact-based examination he uses would not further
the goals of advocates. However, in its current form, Whole Woman 's Health
lacks language that could make it a more feminist opinion and strengthen
women's position by changing the narrative about abortion and reaffirming
their dignity.
54. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). TRAP laws are special regulations passed on medical centers that provide
abortion that go above regulations that apply to centers providing other medical procedures.
55. "The decision in Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt reaffirms a woman's constitutional right to
access legal abortion, and will empower women to fight back against deceptive anti-choice laws in
Texas and beyond. This decisive rejection of clinic shutdown laws marks the most significant
abortion-related ruling from the Court in more than two decades, and will have national impact in
states where similar laws threaten to shutter abortion clinics with medically unnecessary red tape."
Whole Woman 's Health v. Hellerstedt, CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., http://www.reproductiverights.org
/case/whole-womans-health-v-hellerstedt [https://perna.cc/GC37-HIFSZ] (last visited Apr. 11,
2018).
56. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
57. All but nine or ten abortion clinics would have been closed, leaving more than 500 miles without a
clinic. CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., supra note 54.
58. The law required that doctors obtain admitting privileges at local hospitals and that every clinic
meet building requirements to become an ambulatory surgical center. Id.
59. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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A. Rewriting Whole Woman's Health
Below are several portions of the Whole Woman's Health opinion where
Justice Breyer takes positions that support feminist goals, yet the language does
not go far enough in articulating those goals to be considered the language of
feminism. The bold, underlined text reflects where the passages have been
edited to include the language of feminism.
Intro:
[*2300] We conclude that neither of these provisions confers medical
benefits sufficient to justify the burdens upon access that each
imposes. Each places a substantial obstacle in the path of women
seeking to exercise their constitutional right to procure a
previability abortion, each constitutes an undue burden on abortion
access, Casey, supra, at 878, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674
(plurality opinion), and each violates the Federal Constitution. Amdt.
14, §1.
III: Undue Burden - Legal Standard
[*2309] We begin with the standard, as described in Casey. We
recognize that the "State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that
abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed under
circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient." Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973). But,
we added, "a statute which, while furthering [a] valid state interest, has
the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's
choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its
legitimate ends." Casey, 505 U.S., at 877, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed.
2d 674 (plurality opinion). Moreover, "[u]nnecessary health
regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial
obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on
the right." Id., at 878, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674. Imposing
substantial obstacles on a woman's access to an abortion places a
limit on the woman's autonomy and is an anti-feminist and
paternalistic limit to her exercise of a constitutional right.
IV: Undue Burden - Admitting-Privileges Requirement
[*2311] . . . The purpose of the admitting-privileges requirement is to
help ensure that women have easy access to a hospital should
complications arise during an abortion procedure. Brief for
Respondents 32-37. But the District Court found that it brought about
no such health-related benefit. The court found that "[t]he great weight
208 [Vol. 30:197
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of evidence demonstrates that, before the act's passage, abortion in
Texas was extremely safe with particularly low rates of serious
complications and virtually no deaths occurring on account of the
procedure." 46 F. Supp. 3d, at 684. Thus, there was no significant
health-related problem that the new law helped to cure. It is unclear
why Texas would pass such a regulation to add extra requirements
to a relatively safe procedure unless its motives were not tied to
health protection.
[*2313] We recognize that increased driving distances do not always
constitute an "undue burden." See Casey, 505 U.S., at 885-887, 112 S.
Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter, JJ.). But here, those increases are but one additional burden,
which, when taken together with others that the closings brought
about, and when viewed in light of the virtual absence of any health
benefit, lead us to conclude that the record adequately supports the
District Court's "undue burden" conclusion. Cf. id., at 895, 112 S. Ct.
2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (opinion of the Court) (finding burden
"undue" when requirement places "substantial obstacle to a woman's
choice" in "a large fraction of the cases in which" it "is relevant").
When considering the substantial burden that clinic closings have
on women seeking abortions, we cannot Oust consider driving
distances as distinct from the other practical concerns that will be
unique to every woman. As the District Court articulates, factors
such as a "lack of availability of child care, unreliability of
transportation, unavailability of appointments at abortion
facilities, unavailability of time off from work, immigration status
and inability to pass border checkpoints, poverty level, the time
and expense involved in traveling long distances, and other,
inarticulable psychological obstacles" may combine with travel
distance to establish a "de facto barrier" to abortion. The District
Court also recognizes that the clinic closings would have a larger
impact on minority, immigrant, and poor women in the Rio
Grande Valley and El Paso. For many poor women, having to
travel great distances to procure medical care would certainly
amount to a ban on services. When considering whether the
impact of a law amounts to an undue burden, there must be
consideration for all the factors in the lives of women that may
affect access to service--especially for women from disadvantaged
communities.
V: Undue Burden - Surgical-Center Requirement
[*2315] The record makes clear that the surgical-center requirement
provides no benefit when complications arise in the context of an
abortion produced through medication. That is because, in such a case,
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complications would almost always arise only after the patient has left
the facility. See supra, at _, 195 L. Ed. 2d, at 687; App. 278. The
record also contains evidence indicating that abortions taking place in
an abortion facility are safe-indeed, safer than numerous procedures
that take place outside hospitals and to which Texas does not apply its
surgical-center requirements. See, e.g., id., at 223-224, 254, 275-279.
The total number of deaths in Texas from abortions was five in the
period from 2001 to 2012, or about one every two years (that is to say,
one out of about 120,000 to 144,000 abortions). Id., at 272.
Nationwide, childbirth is 14 times more likely than abortion to result
in death, ibid., but Texas law allows a midwife to oversee childbirth in
the patient's own home. Colonoscopy, a procedure that typically takes
place outside a hospital (or surgical center) setting, has a mortality rate
10 times higher than an abortion. Id., at 276-277; see ACOG Brief 15
(the mortality rate for liposuction, another outpatient procedure, is 28
times higher than the mortality rate for abortion). Medical treatment
after an incomplete miscarriage often involves a procedure identical to
that involved in a nonmedical abortion, but it often takes place outside
a hospital or surgical center. App. 254; see ACOG Brief 14 (same).
And Texas partly or wholly grandfathers (or waives in whole or in part
the surgical-center requirement for) about two-thirds of the facilities to
which the surgical-center standards apply. But it neither grandfathers
nor provides waivers for any of the facilities that perform abortions. 46
F. Supp. 3d, at 680-681; see App. 184. These facts indicate that the
surgical-center provision imposes "a requirement that simply is not
based on differences" between abortion and other surgical procedures
"that are reasonably related to" preserving women's health, the
asserted "purpos[e] of the Act in which it is found." Doe, 410 U.S., at
194, 93 S. Ct. 739, 35 L. Ed. 2d 201 (quoting Morey v. Doud, 354
U.S. 457, 465, 77 S. Ct. 1344, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1485 (1957); internal
quotation marks omitted). We should not allow the very nature of
these laws purportedly in the interest of women's health to go
unexamined in light of the relative safety of abortion procedures.
It is paternalistic and contrary to the ideals of equality for
legislatures to single out procedures that only women receive for
extra regulation over other medical procedures of equal or greater
risk that men or both genders undergo. This single-minded focus
on abortion over other procedures should not be permitted to
cloak itself in an interest in women's health.
[*2318] More fundamentally, in the face of no threat to women's
health, Texas seeks to force women to travel long distances to get
abortions in crammed-to-capacity superfacilities. Patients seeking
these services are less likely to get the kind of individualized attention,
serious conversation, and emotional support that doctors at less taxed
facilities may have offered, the kind of service that would give
women the best health care possible. Healthcare facilities and
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medical professionals are not fungible commodities. Surgical centers
attempting to accommodate sudden, vastly increased demand, see 46
F. Supp. 3d, at 682, may find that quality of care declines. Another
commonsense inference that the District Court made is that these
effects would be harmful to, not supportive of, women's health. See
id., at 682-683. The Texas Legislature is making a paternalistic
assumption that legislatures, not women themselves, are in the
best position to judge what is best for a woman's health regarding
one procedure out of many she may have in her lifetime. Texas is
making changes to abortion regulations in the name of women's
health that would, in reality, have a negative effect on women's
health.
VI:
[*2320] Second, Texas claims that the provisions at issue here do not
impose a substantial obstacle because the women affected by those
laws are not a "large fraction" of Texan women "of reproductive age,"
which Texas reads Casey to have required. See Brief for Respondents
45, 48. But [19] Casey used the language "large fraction" to refer to "a
large fraction of cases in which [the provision at issue] is relevant," a
class narrower than "all women," "pregnant women," or even "the
class of women seeking abortions identified by the State." 505 U.S., at
894-895, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (opinion of the Court)
(emphasis added). Here, as in Casey, the relevant denominator is
"those [women] for whom [the provision] is an actual rather than an
irrelevant restriction." Id., at 895, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674.
We must recognize, as the District Court has, that the Constitution
and Roe have articulated the right to a previability abortion as a
right for all women, not Oust women with means. By enacting laws
that will lead to the closure of clinics in Texas, the Legislature has
created a situation for many women in Texas that will effectively
be a complete ban on abortions. As discussed above, these clinic
closures would be especially hard on poor, immigrant, and
minority women.
B. Examining the Language Added
There are three themes that the above added language addresses to
articulate the language of feminism missing from Whole Woman 's Health.
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1. Feminist language would acknowledge the anti-feminist and
paternalistic nature of actions that limit women's autonomy by placing
substantial burdens on their exercise of a constitutional right.
[*2300] ... to exercise their constitutional right to procure ...
[*2309] ... Imposing substantial obstacles on a woman's access to an
abortion places a limit on the woman's autonomy and is an anti-
feminist and paternalistic limit to her exercise of a constitutional
rig~ht.
The goal of TRAP laws is undoubtedly to limit women's access to
abortions with the goal of stopping all abortions from taking place.60 These
goals place the judgment of legislators above the autonomy of women in
making one of the most personal choices an individual can make - the choice
to become a mother. Opinions about TRAP laws should be clear on this point.
This clarity includes language stressing that the action of procuring an abortion
is an exercise of a woman's constitutional right. In the second section, *2309,
the language calls these attacks on a woman's autonomy anti-feminist and
paternalistic, specifically using two of the words discussed in Part II to call out
attacks on women.
60. "A few months ahead of signing HB2 into law, Texas Governor Rick Perry declared at an anti-
abortion rally, 'an ideal world is one without abortion. Until then, we will continue to pass laws to
ensure that they are rare as possible.' In July 2015, Texas state representative and HB2 author
Jodie Laubenberg stated, 'I am so proud that Texas always takes the lead in trying to turn back
what started with Roe v. Wade."' CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., supra note 54.
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2. Feminist language would clearly state that it is paternalistic to write
laws that purportedly protect women's health when they single out a
procedure that only women undergo.
[*2311] ... It is unclear why Texas would pass such a regulation to
add extra requirements to a relatively safe procedure unless its
motives were not tied to health protection.
[*2315] . . . We should not allow the very nature of these laws
purportedly in the interest of women's health to go unexamined in
light of the relative safety of abortion procedures. It is paternalistic
and contrary to the ideals of equality for legislatures to single out
procedures that only women receive for extra regulation over other
medical procedures of equal or greater risk that men or both genders
undergo. This single-minded focus on abortion over other procedures
should not be permitted to cloak itself in an interest in women's
health.
[*2318] ... the kind of service that would give women the best health
care possible. . . . The Texas Legislature is making a paternalistic
assumption that legislatures, not women themselves, are in the best
position to judge what is best for a woman's health regarding one
procedure out of many she may have in her lifetime. Texas is making
changes to abortion regulations in the name of women's health that
would, in reality, have a negative effect on women's health.
Legislation about women's health is inherently paternalistic because of the
"protective" way lawmakers single out procedures that affect only women and
design regulations to make access to these procedures more onerous. In *2311,
the opinion blatantly acknowledges that the laws that Texas claims to protect
women's health are not tied to a health rationale at all.61 Further expanding on
that point, *2315 more specifically states that they are paternalistic, a word of
feminism, and that legislatures cannot cloak their desire to stop all abortions in
laws that claim to be about women's health. Finally, at *2318, the added
language more forcefully calls out the legislature for enacting laws in the name
of women's health that would, in reality, have no positive effect whatsoever
and would provide worse service for women than exists under the current
regulation regime.
61. This suggestion also takes on a feature of Professor Stanchi's feminist "antilanguage," using
sarcasm as a negative rhetorical device to talk about women's experience with the patriarchy.
Stanchi, supra note 18, at 408.
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3. Feminist language in these opinions would explicitly recognize the
intersectionality ofrace, poverty, and gender when applying the undue
burden standard.
[*2313] ... When considering the substantial burden that clinic
closings have on women seeking abortions, we cannot just consider
driving distances as distinct from the other practical concerns that
will be unique to every woman. As the District Court articulates,
factors such as a "lack of availability of child care, unreliability of
transportation, unavailability of appointments at abortion facilities,
unavailability of time off from work, immigration status and inability
to pass border checkpoints, poverty level, the time and expense
involved in traveling long distances, and other, inarticulable
psychological obstacles" may combine with travel distance to establish
a "de facto barrier" to abortion. The District Court also recognizes
that the clinic closings would have a larger impact on minority,
immigrant, and poor women in the Rio Grande Valley and El Paso.
For many poor women, having to travel great distances to procure
medical care would certainly amount to a ban on services. When
considering whether the impact of a law amounts to an undue burden,
there must be consideration for all the factors in the lives of women
that may affect access to service--especially for women from
disadvantaged communities.
[*2320] .. . We must recognize, as the District Court has, that the
Constitution and Roe have articulated the right to a previability
abortion as a right for all women, not just women with means. By
enacting laws that will lead to the closure of clinics in Texas, the
Legislature has created a situation for many women in Texas that will
effectively be a complete ban on abortions. As discussed above, these
clinic closures would be especially hard on poor, immigrant, and
minority women.
Acknowledging the intersectionality of women's experiences is an
important part of creating a language that truly represents the values of the
modern feminist movement. In Whole Woman 's Health v. Lakey, the district
court recognized that this law would affect poor, immigrant, and minority
women more harshly than it would affect affluent women who could afford to
take time off from work and drive hundreds of miles to receive an abortion.6 2
In *2313, the feminist opinion clearly articulates how this law will affect
62. 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 683 (W.D. Tex. 2014).
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different women in different ways because of the vulnerabilities they
individually and uniquely bring to the table. Additionally, in *2320, the opinion
further articulates that the right to abortion is no right if only women with
means can exercise it.
IV. WHAT FEMINIST LANGUAGE IN WHOLE WOMAN'S HEALTH COULD
ACCOMPLISH
The addition of the language of feminism in Whole Woman 's Health could
have real impact on both the law and the lives of women. The language could
reaffirm the dignity and bodily integrity of women that TRAP laws attempt to
erase through limiting women's choices. Feminist language could signal the
commitment of law to female autonomy and the right to abortion to the public.
The Court could send a signal to lower courts on the value of women's
autonomy as they consider additional TRAP laws. Finally, the use of feminist
language in Whole Woman's Health could open the door for incorporating
additional language of feminism in future opinions at all levels of the federal
judiciary.
While some may argue that such changes in language are trivial, there is
real value in the addition of feminist language to opinions. Critics of such
addition could fall into several categories. First, anti-abortion advocates could
argue that decisions like Gonzales v. Carhart, which take a protectionist
attitude toward both the mother and the fetus, are correctly decided. 63 This
attitude undermines the dignity of women.64 Second, one could argue that
beyond the outcome of the decision, the language of Supreme Court opinions
matters little. But, as Part I demonstrates, the language contained in opinions
matters and reinforces existing power structures.65 Finally, critics could argue
that there would be little positive effect, even if opinions did include more
feminist language. The arguments in this section seek to counter these by
showing the positive impact of feminist language, specifically in Whole
Woman's Health.
A. Reaffirm the Dignity and Bodily Integrity of Women
TRAP laws are merely another, more modem way that legislatures in some
states are attempting to deny women access to abortion. Courts should
specifically acknowledge this reality. Every abortion decision is an opportunity
to remind the country that these laws are not just limitations on doctors and
63. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
64. See infra Parts IV(A)-(B).
65. See supra Part I.
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clinics, but are attempts to strip women of constitutional rights and autonomy.
66 In the current political climate, where the rights of women are easily
discarded and cheapened, calling these laws what they are is vital to confirming
to both women, and to the legislatures who would curb their rights, that the
constitutional guarantee of abortion is not up for debate. There is a benefit to
speaking specifically to the anti-feminist nature of TRAP laws beyond their
unconstitutionality under the undue burden standard.
B. Support Women in Exercising Their Right to Abortion
As discussed in Part I, Supreme Court opinions serve as the Supreme
Court's communication with the public.67 Since Roe, Supreme Court opinions
have directly contributed to the stigma surrounding abortion and the
uncertainty of the right to an abortion both in law and in the public discourse. 6 8
Its jurisprudence has allowed the state to express a greater interest in fetal life
and pursue laws to that end. These laws may make women feel marginalized as
they try to navigate the laws of informed consent, waiting periods, and
mandatory ultrasounds while attempting to exercise their constitutional rights. 69
The language in these cases can also have a negative impact. In both
Planned Parenthood v. Casey70 and Gonzales v. Carhart, 7 the majority
opinions seem to express a distaste for abortion through the way they describe
the procedure and articulate the state's interest. In Casey, Justice O'Connor
focuses on the states' strong interest in fetal life and includes language that
speaks to the strong moralistic opposition to abortion.7 2 In Carhart, Justice
66. Journalist Linda Greenhouse described the importance of equality affirming language: "When I
first read Justice Breyer's opinion, my sense of relief struggled against a feeling that something
nonetheless was missing: not necessarily the aspirational rhetoric of the Casey decision but some
explicit acknowledgment of what it means to women's equality and dignity not to be trapped in an
unwanted pregnancy." Linda Greenhouse, The Facts Win Out on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/opinion/the-facts-win-out-on-abortion.html [https://
perma.cc/NSA5-J487].
67. For example, Justice Kennedy's infamous line in Gonzales v. Carhart that "[w]hile we find no
reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women
come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained," 550 U.S. 124,
159 (2007), was discussed in many news publications. See Robin Toner, Abortion Foes See
Validation for New Tactic, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/22
/washington/22abortion.html [https://perma.cc/6JCT-JXG9]; see also Nina Totenberg, High Court
Ruling a Blow to Abortion Rights, NPR MORNING EDITION, Apr. 19, 2007, https://www.npr.org
/templates/story/story.php?storyld-9678520 [https://perma.cc/D2TU-27SG].
68. For further discussion on Supreme Court opinions and abortion stigma, see Paula Abrams,
Abortion Stigma: The Legacy of Casey, 35 WOMEN's RIGHTS L. REP. 299 (2014).
69. Id at 302.
70. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
71. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
72. 505 U.S. at 850 ("Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of
morality.").
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Kennedy explains abortion procedures, and the moralistic concern with them,
in great detail and uses paternalistic language to describe the state's interest in
preventing women from regretting their abortions.7 3 This language is the
language of anti-abortion activists; activists who then capitalize on that
language to help pass additional laws to reduce access to abortion.7 4 As anti-
abortion laws make it harder for women to access abortion, the stigma
associated with abortion rises and women feel increasingly marginalized.7 5
Supreme Court opinions do not exist in a vacuum and their language has
effects on women's ability to access abortion and how abortion is perceived. If
the negative language and outcomes of Casey and Carhart can increase
abortion stigma, perhaps the language of feminism in Supreme Court opinions
can reverse this effect. As this paper demonstrates, it is possible to write an
opinion that celebrates and accepts a woman's right to procure an abortion.
Using feminist language can lead to greater inclusion of women's real and
lived experiences and acknowledge the negative impact paternalism in our laws
can have on these experiences.
C. Signal to Lower Courts
Twenty-three states have TRAP laws on the books that go beyond what is
medically necessary for patient safety.76 With the election of President Donald
Trump, a new conservative Justice on the Supreme Court, and energized anti-
73. 550 U.S. 159 ("While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems
unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they
once created and sustained."). See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Back Ban on Method of Abortion,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/19/washington/19scotus.html
("Most notable was the emphasis in the majority opinion, by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, on the
implication of abortion's 'ethical and moral concerns."').
74. Justice Kennedy's statement in Carhart that, "it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women
come to regret their choice," 550 U.S. at 159, cited to the amicus brief of a pro-life organization,
the Justice Foundation. See Brief for Sandra Cano et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Gonzales v. Charhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (No. 05-380). "Many, on both sides, viewed that as an
invitation from a newly conservative court to pass tough new counseling and informed-consent
laws intended for women seeking abortions-'a green light for enhanced informed consent,' in the
words of Clarke D. Forsythe, president of Americans United for Life, a leader in that legislative
effort." Toner, supra note 63. See also Newsweek Staff, Abortion: Battles on Three Fronts,
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 29, 2007, www.newsweek.com/abortion-battles-three-fronts-98013 [https://
perma.cc/3KD7-Y7EE] ("In last week's opinion he didn't reject the landmark abortion-rights
decision, but his language pleased pro-lifers. 'Kennedy is very much speaking in the code
language of the anti-abortion activists,' says David Garrow, a legal historian at the University of
Cambridge. The justice [sic] used 'kill' or 'killing' 11 times to refer to abortion and argued that
'some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and
sustained."').
75. Abrams, supra note 64, at 302.
76. Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, GUTTMACHER INST., Apr. 1, 2018, http://www
.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/targeted-regulation-abortion-providers [https://perma.cc
/CC8A-4KLD] (last visited Apr. 11, 2018).
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women state legislators, there most likely will not be any rollback of these laws
in the near future." Lower federal courts will likely see more challenges to
these laws as advocates attempt to use the decision in Whole Woman 's Health
to strike down some of these regulations that will cause clinics to close across
the country.78 Feminist language could change the lenses through which the
district courts examine these claims, forcing them to take into greater
consideration how laws affect poor and minority women, the paternalistic
nature of TRAP laws, and women's autonomy. Strong feminist language that
reaffirms this Court's commitment to protecting the autonomy of women
would signal to lower courts where the Supreme Court falls on this issue.
D. Open the Door for the Legal Language ofFeminism
As Neumeister describes, "the Court's status as an important American
institution means that it has the power to shape society as well as merely
reacting to and reflecting it."79 Language in Supreme Court opinions becomes
the language of lower courts.o If the language of feminism becomes the
language with which the Supreme Court talks about abortion restrictions, lower
courts could also start incorporating this language into their opinions-not only
in abortion cases, but also in other areas of law. If Supreme Court opinions
used the language of feminism, they would make the language of feminism part
of the language of law." Making feminism part of the language of law "would
establish that scholarship, jurisprudence, and reasoning adhering to this
appellation are within the language of law."8 2
77. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, The Worrisome Future ofAbortion Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/09/opinion/the-worrisome-future-of-abortion-rights.html
[https://perma.cc/C2J9-BN99]; Danielle Paquette & Kim Soffen, What Abortion Could Look Like
in America Under Donald Trump, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/wonk/wp/2016/11/15/what-abortion-could-look-like-in-an-america-without-roe-v-wade
[https://permacc/FWV3-TLNT].
78. For example, the Center for Reproductive Rights brought a lawsuit on the anniversary of the
Whole Woman's Health decision challenging the entire abortion licensing regime in Louisiana.
Press Release, Ctr. for Reprod. Rts., Center for Reproductive Rights Challenges Louisiana Clinic
Shutdown Laws One Year After Historic Supreme Court Decision (June 27, 2017), https://www
.reproductiverights.org/press-room/center-for-reproductive-rights-challenges-louisiana-clinic-
shutdown-laws [https://perma.cc/ZDF7-V8N8] (last visited Apr. 11, 2018).
79. Neumeister, supra note 29, at 265 (citation omitted).
80. See supra Part I(A).
81. See Neumeister, supra note 29, at 265.
82. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The language of Supreme Court opinions is salient and ever-lasting; it is a
constant reminder of how the law treats and respects individuals at any given
moment in history. In this moment, the rights of women are under attack and
the language in Supreme Court opinions can play a unique role in meeting that
attack head on. The decision in Whole Woman 's Health was a good decision
for women and for abortion access, but it could have been a better opinion for
women if it had used the language of feminism to reaffirm the Court's
commitment to a woman's right to an abortion. Adding the language of
feminism to Whole Woman's Health could have played an important role in
affirming the dignity of women, shown public support for the right to procure
an abortion, signaled to the lower courts that TRAP laws are an attack on
women's autonomy, and opened the door for the language of feminism in
Supreme Court opinions. History is always watching, but it is also listening.

